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WORKING KNOWLEDGE:  EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE 
RISE OF CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930, 
by Catherine L. Fisk.  University of North Carolina Press, 2009. 360 pp.  
Cloth $45.00. 
 
Reviewed by Kara W. Swanson, Northeastern University School of Law.   
k.swanson@neu.edu. 
 
What do gunpowder, light opera, and road maps have in common?  Each is 
produced through a commercial enterprise that, according to Catherine Fisk, 
exemplifies the nineteenth and early-twentieth century transformation of 
workplace knowledge into corporate intellectual property.  By intertwining 
labor and business history with the legal history of intellectual property, 
Fisk builds her central argument that “corporate ownership of workplace 
knowledge came into existence as employment shifted from being a 
relationship where legal obligations were determined primarily by status . . . 
to being one where legal obligations are determined primarily by contract” 
(p.2).  Modern intellectual property is, Fisk tells us, intrinsically a creature 
of employment law and practice.  Her exploration of this joint history is a 
significant contribution to both fields. 
 
The Du Pont company provides a through-line for Fisk’s book.  Founded in 
1802 as a gunpowder manufactory, Du Pont built its business during its first 
decades on the secret chemical knowledge of its French founders.  The 
papers of the Du Pont family, along with published opinions and court 
records of the cases litigated by the company, allow Fisk to trace the legal 
meanings and business practices surrounding workplace knowledge across 
her focal period, from 1800 to 1930.  In the first decades of the nineteenth 
century, the family-run enterprise relied on “secrecy and reputational 
sanctions” to guard against the diffusion of its knowledge to competitors 
(p.45).  The Du Ponts separated the steps of gunpowder production into 
different buildings, limiting the ability of their own employees to 
understand the entire process (and guarding against explosions), and also 
provided employee housing in a “remote and self-contained enclave” 
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outside of Wilmington, Delaware, allowing the owners to better control 
their employees’ interactions with outsiders (p.46).  In 1808, when a 
competitor sent an agent to lure away Du Pont workers and obtain some of 
the manufacturing equipment, the Du Ponts rapidly learned of the 
interloper, beat him severely, and had him prosecuted for theft (pp.46-48).  
The Du Ponts’ self-help was more effective than the law – the agent was 
acquitted of criminal charges, and turned around and sued the company for 
malicious prosecution.  A later competitor’s attempt to buy information 
from a Du Pont powderman led the company to threaten the competitor 
with, not litigation, but reputational sanctions through publication of the 
correspondence with the powderman, which the company eventually did in 
a pamphlet called “Villainy Detected” (pp.50-53).   
 
One hundred years later, the Du Pont company underwent a massive 
reorganization intended to transform the family business into a “large, 
vertically integrated, and centrally administered firm” (p.196) – in short, a 
modern corporation using modern management practices.  Corporate R&D 
became part of the bureaucracy, concentrated in two laboratories (p.196).  
Instead of focusing on the villainy of their competitors, the Du Ponts 
focused on legal control of their own employees through written 
employment agreements requiring employees to acknowledge the 
company’s ownership of all “inventions, improvements or useful processes” 
(p.197).  In 1914, the company sued a departing chemist, seeking to prevent 
him from using knowledge the company claimed as trade secrets (p.203).  
Rather than the Du Ponts themselves intervening with fists, their patent 
attorney hired a private detective to infiltrate the new business of the former 
employee and collect evidence (p.206).  While the litigation was 
inconclusive, it motivated the company to tighten all its employee contracts 
as a now-useful part of its business strategy (p.206).  Its creative employees, 
meanwhile, had to reconfigure their middle-class status.  Their hallmark as 
“free labor,” the ability to exploit their own ideas and inventions, and to 
leave to develop their own businesses, had been removed.  Instead, 
scientists and engineers employed by Du Pont and other similar 
corporations had to rely on the social markers of education, income, and 
consumption to designate their class status, becoming what Fisk calls the 
“new middle class” of the consumer society (p.245). 
 
The Du Pont story exemplifies the transformation of the American 
workplace from the small shops of the early republic and Jacksonian period 
to the modern integrated corporation.  Drawing on her expertise in labor and 
employment law, Fisk adds a much-needed perspective to the historical 
development of “intellectual property” as a concept.  (The term was first 
The IP Law Book Review                                                                        2 
 
 
used in a published judicial opinion in 1845) (p.36).  How did workplace 
knowledge change from something so unownable that the Du Ponts in 1808 
had no legal basis to stop employees and their knowledge from walking out 
the door, to a taken-for-granted corporate asset, routinely protected by 
legally enforceable contracts by 1930?  Part of the answer is the steady 
expansion of intellectual property itself, particularly in the coverage of 
copyright and trade secrets, topics to which Fisk devotes several chapters.  
The domain of “workplace knowledge” expanded.  But Fisk goes beyond 
intellectual property doctrines to detail the accompanying change in the 
workplace itself.  While Fisk steadfastly refuses to give a “monocausal 
explanation” in answer to her fundamental question (p.6), she argues for a 
list of contributing factors for this joint development:  the ideology of free 
labor and its interaction with corporate power, changing understandings of 
the middle class, the transcendence of contract discourse, and the 
development of a consumer society (pp.6-11).  Ultimately, Fisk places most 
of her emphasis on the “growth of corporations and the rapid spread of 
office and factory work” with an accompanying “’systemization of 
knowledge’” and “bureaucratic employment practices” (pp.240, 246-47).  
Together with the triumph of contract over status to define employer-
employee relations, the new workplace supported the “commodification” of 
creative labor and the transformation of the creative entrepreneur of the 
1830s into the corporate “man in the gray flannel suit” of the 1930s. 
 
Fisk presents her historical narrative as a declension story:  “For highly 
skilled, talented, and innovative workers, the move from status to contract 
was one from entrepreneurship to dependence” (p.2).  It is a story which 
echoes one previously told by labor historians about the loss of autonomy 
by those who labored with their hands.1  Fisk’s story describes the 
uncomfortable similarity between the fate of manual labor and that of 
mental labor.  These “mechanics” begin the nineteenth century as 
entrepreneurs, the “best case” for free labor ideology (p.249), owning the 
fruits of their hands and minds.  At the end of her story, however, skilled 
workers are middle management drones, blocked from starting their own 
business, or even from moving to another corporate employer, by their 
inability to use any of their ideas or knowledge outside their employing 
corporation.  Their reward instead is steady employment, compensation 
sufficient to support a suburban middle-class lifestyle, and internal 
recognition through financial rewards and attribution.  Fisk’s detailed 
knowledge of employment law allows her to draw the connection between 
the expansion of master-servant law and intellectual property law.  Just as 
the knowledge of creative workers was unownable in the early nineteenth 
century, such men had been themselves unownable.2  They were not 
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included within the narrow legal category of “servant,” with apprentices and 
domestic help.  By the end of Fisk’s period, not only had the legal 
ownership of knowledge expanded through the developing law of 
intellectual property, but the category of servant had swallowed mental 
workers and manual laborers alike, destroying the previous legal distinction 
which had supported a class distinction.  
 
To explain her argument, Fisk reaches beyond Du Pont’s chemical 
processes and machines to artistic labors.  The starting point of her story 
thus includes not only gunpowder but also the theater.  Today’s noncompete 
agreements can be traced in their earliest form, according to Fisk, to judicial 
orders prohibiting a performer from working for another theater, adopting 
an English case enjoining an opera singer from changing stages (pp.138, 
160-62).  Further, authors and adaptors of plays fought with theater owners 
for copyright control of works, and long before the work-for-hire doctrine 
was established by statute in 1909, a case involving the American 
adaptation of Gilbert and Sullivan’s Mikado established the principal that 
ownership of creative works could be shifted to an employer through 
contract, even in the absence of formal assignment of copyright (p.158).  
Talent itself could be enjoined and transferred, by law and by contract, 
thereby undercutting earlier understandings of free labor as including the 
ability to quit employment and start anew, and the ability to own and 
control one’s own work product.  An opera singer, it turns out, is the legal 
antecedent of the man in the gray flannel suit working for Eastman Kodak 
in Rochester, New York (another of Fisk’s corporate examples) (pp.188-
196), or for the twentieth century diversified Du Pont company in 
Wilmington.   
 
While accurately claiming to create “an intellectual history of legal 
doctrines and a social history of ideas,” Fisk sells herself short.  One of her 
book’s great strengths is that it is as much a story of the particular history of 
the “mechanic” as a type of working man as it is a story of ideas.  She 
mines four corporate archives in addition to the Du Pont family papers to 
discern actual workplace knowledge practices, combining the results with 
the traditional tools of legal history – case law, treatises, and court records.  
She grounds each chapter in detailed stories, fleshed out from legal 
disputes.  In her concluding chapter, Fisk introduces the first American road 
maps as corporate intellectual property, the result of the early-twentieth-
century understandings of talent and business management.  From its 
founding in 1864, the Rand McNally corporation built its business on the 
long-term employment of numerous authors, managing creativity to sell 
maps and guides (p.227).  By the turn of the twentieth century, it 
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“resembled the evolution of corporate research laboratories” in its 
organization, recruitment of creative talent, absolute ownership of all 
employee product, and substitution of “an internal economy of credit and 
reputation” for employee ownership of their work product (p.230).  The 
“Father of Road Maps,” John G. Brink, worked for Rand McNally as an 
independent contractor in the 1910s and 1920s, but all map copyrights were 
in the name of Rand McNally.  When in the late 1920s the company 
decided to replicate its success in providing the first automobile travel maps 
with “air trails maps” for the new aviators, those maps were created and 
published without any individual authorship credit (pp.232-34).  The author, 
just like the inventor, had been subsumed within the corporation. 
 
Fisk’s very readable and well-organized book will be of great interest to 
those specializing in contemporary aspects of intellectual property and labor 
and employment law, as well as to historians of labor, business, and 
technology.  Less obviously, she speaks to other scholarly debates.  While 
Fisk’s focus is the skilled artisan, there are interesting parallels between her 
story and the development of the professions in the nineteenth century.  
During this period, doctors and lawyers struggled to define themselves 
based on specialized knowledge, a process which, for doctors, depended on 
establishing a property right in that knowledge.  In the late nineteenth 
century, doctors bitterly claimed that their subpoenaed appearances in 
courtrooms as expert medical witnesses without compensation constituted 
theft of their “professional knowledge, which forms their capital in 
business.3  Some doctors went so far as to refuse to testify without proper 
payment, risking contempt of court sanctions.  In these legal battles, the 
opponent was not the corporation, but the state.  Fisk’s work provides an 
opportunity to reconsider the development of the medical examiner as a 
civil servant, and in so doing, to broaden her narrative beyond explicit 
reliance on intellectual property doctrines to the other ways of articulating 
property in knowledge in the legal context. 
 
  Her story of the transformation of workplace knowledge can also be read 
as a detailed case study that tests Morton Horwitz’s theory of 
transformation of American law in the nineteenth century from the 
dominance of property to the dominance of contract.4  Fisk’s work 
embellishes this broad theme in two ways.  It adds evidence to the rise of 
contract discourse by detailing the effects of reinterpreting the work of 
skilled, specialized producers through contractual understandings of their 
relationship to their mental efforts and to the firms which hired them.  It 
also expands our understanding of the historical development of legal 
theories of property by tying one particular type of property, intellectual 
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property, precisely to the rise of contract.  Fisk also deliberately sets her 
story of the “mechanic” as part of the intellectual history of free labor 
ideology as a guiding, but troubled, principle of American self-
understanding, thus joining scholars such as Sean Wilentz and Christopher 
Tomlins in understanding the mutually constitutive transformation of 
American labor, law, and business in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century, and adding the “thinking man” to the “working man” in that 
history.5  Fisk’s inclusion of the development of a consumer society as a 
causal factor in the changes she traces is provocative and plausible, but 
steps beyond the strength of her careful research, leaving it a less 
convincing part of her argument – merely because other parts are made with 
such specificity and strength.  There is room here for further work by Fisk 
or others.  As Fisk suggests, she also offers food for thought to those 
considering commodification in the context of twenty-first century 
intellectual property debates (pp.2, 254-55).  The commodification, or 
marketization, of “everything”,6 including invention and mental labor, is 
not, Fisk reminds us, a twenty-first or even twentieth century phenomenon.  
Nor, as Fisk has so carefully shown, is it a simple matter of new statutes or 
tweaked legal doctrines.  Practice and customs in the “social setting of 
work” in multiple, diverse enterprises, from the stage to the factory floor, as 
well as “changes in the nature of human personality” need to be considered 
in contemporary policy discussions (p.254).  
 
ENDNOTES 
 
 
1 Fisk cites this literature in Introduction, note 2, and Part I, note 1.  A 
further case study is Hugh G.J. Aitken, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN 
ACTION:  TAYLORISM AT WATERTOWN ARSENAL, 1908-1915 
(Princeton University Press, 1985 [1960]). 
 
2 As Fisk recognizes, the use of “men” is appropriate, as her characters are 
nearly all men – with the notable exception of her discussion of Laura 
Keene, an actress, playwright, and theater manager (pp.143-49).  The 
characters are also nearly all European Americans.  Fisk makes a tantalizing 
reference to the failure of courts to take up postbellum sharecropper 
decisions into the mainstream of employee mobility jurisprudence, 
suggesting an avenue for future work regarding the racial dimensions of the 
class story she relates (p.163). 
 
3 James C. Mohr, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE IN NINTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996 [1993]), 200. 
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4 Morton J. Horowitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1870-1960:  THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (Oxford 
University Press, 1992). 
 
5 Christopher L. Tomlins, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE 
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (Cambridge University Press, 1993); 
Christopher L. Tomlins, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS:  LABOR 
RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN 
AMERICA, 1880-1960 (Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sean Wilentz, 
CHANTS DEMOCRATIC:  NEW YORK AND THE RISE OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850 (Oxford University Press, 
1984). 
 
6 A recent collection of essays from the large recent literature critiquing the 
commodification of seemingly everything is Gordon Laxer and Dennis 
Soron (eds.), NOT FOR SALE:  DECOMMODIFYING PUBLIC LIFE 
(Broadview Press, 2006). 
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THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT, 
by Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley.  The University of Chicago Press, 
2009. 220 pp. Cloth $ 45.00. 
 
Reviewed by Shubha Ghosh, University of Wisconsin Law School.  
ghosh7@wisc.edu 
 
This long awaited book by Professors Burk and Lemley brings together 
their numerous and insightful articles on patent law, published over the past 
decade, and elaborates on their ideas in light of the current patent reform 
debate.  Calling the book “long awaited” is perhaps an exaggeration, but I 
personally have been waiting for this book for a while.  The delay may 
have, in part, to do with the unpredictable manner in which global patent 
reform has progressed during the past five years.  Developing countries, 
such as India, have restructured their patent system to meet requirements 
under the TRIPS Agreement.  Meanwhile, the United States, a main driver 
for the TRIPS requirements in the 1980’s and 1990’s, has been 
backtracking through myriad proposals to restructure its own patent law.   
 
This rethinking of U.S. patent law has occurred on many fronts.  The 
USPTO initiated administrative reforms in 2007 that were quickly enjoined 
and have been more narrowly construed by the Federal Circuit.  Congress 
pushed radical patent law reform that would have, among other changes, 
transformed patent law to a first inventor to file system, an odd chimera 
worthy of Greek mythology.  Finally, the Supreme Court has been 
extremely involved in addressing (and creating) questions about U.S. patent 
law with five critical opinions issued over the past five years, and one 
important one pending during the 2009-2010 term.1   
 
With all this activity, any promised book on patent reform runs the risk of 
being irrelevant upon publication.  Thankfully, Professors Burk and Lemley 
have published an important, moderate, reasonable book that cuts through 
all these reform efforts that have largely operated at cross purposes.  They 
define the “patent crisis” precisely, and their solution offers light that 
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contrasts with the heat of legislative reform that is perhaps not as 
convoluted as health care reform, but is certainly driven by competing 
interests that cannot readily be balanced.   Recent efforts at patent reform in 
the U.S. have been in the paranoid style of politics with rumor and fear 
displacing informed and rational discussion.  A student recently asked me, 
with deep concern and worry in his eyes: “Is it true that [new USPTO 
commissioner] Kappos is doing away with Request for Continued 
Examinations?”  Another example of the paranoid tendency occurred at a 
panel discussion, in which I participated, on the pending Bilski v. Kappos 
case.2  One of the panelists asked, with dismay: “Can we trust the Supreme 
Court?”  “I guess we have to”, I responded.  But then again can we trust 
anyone?  Professors Burk and Lemley’s book provides a rational 
counterpoint to some of the dismay that often surfaces in legislative 
debates, with patent reform no exception. 
 
What is the crisis that has generated so many and varied responses?  
According to Professors Burk and Lemley, the crisis arises from a tension 
between a generalist patent statute, with the 1952 Patent Act as the most 
recent iteration, and industries that have developed in unforeseeable ways 
over the past fifty-seven years (pp.31-32). In 1952, biotechnology and 
software were the stuff of science fiction.  Congress’ revision of patent law 
after World War Two aimed at clarifying the law, codifying some 
provisions such as nonobviousness, and creating a broad set of rules that 
would promote innovation and invention across a wide range of industries 
and technologies.  The problem is that different types of patent rules may be 
conducive to progress in different industries.  Patent law needs to be 
tailored to the customs, practices, and industry structure of various 
technologies.  For example, narrower patent scope may be more conducive 
to innovation in software than in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.   
Doctrines like utility, nonobviousness, and enablement affect the breadth of 
patent claims and the reach of the exclusionary right.  They also affect 
incentives to seek patents, resulting in patent thickets, patents of 
questionable quality, and patents too narrowly construed as to result in anti-
commons, that is, too much subdivided and dispersed ownership in an 
invention.  This tension between a generalist patent statute and the need for 
narrowly tailored doctrines creates a perfect storm for patent reform as 
various parties attempt to shift patent law towards the interests of a 
particular group or industry.  No invisible hand, however, can readily 
reconcile these disparate interests into harmony.  Hence, we end up with the 
cacophony and hodgepodge of reform efforts. 
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What Professors Burk and Lemley offer as a solution is the courts.  At a 
broad level, they are absolutely right.  I am sympathetic that in a few deft 
cases the Supreme Court has corrected certain problems in the patent 
system.  Its 2006 eBay decision, although criticized at the time, did address 
some of the concerns with the anticompetitive uses of patent litigation.3 
Similarly, its 2008 Quanta decision, if narrowly construed to pass through 
license terms, provided an important balance between patent and contract 
rights.4   On the other hand, of course, the Supreme Court has handed down 
some opinions that arguably complicate the institutional landscape of patent 
law.  The 2007 Medimmune decision complicated the lives of licensing 
practitioners in not particularly socially productive ways.5   A few months 
after that decision, the Court handed down the infamous KSR opinion, 
which was a missed opportunity for adding structure to the nonobviousness 
inquiry.6  At one level, the appeal to the courts, at least the Supreme Court, 
seems misguided. 
 
Of course, Professors Burk and Lemley are appealing to the courts in the 
abstract, as the institution that can provide some guidance in a comparative 
sense.  At that level of institutional analysis, they are correct.  The tension 
between a general statute, like the Patent Act, and the varied, complicated 
industries that the statute purports to govern leads invariably to either a 
fragmentation of the statutory scheme to address diverse special cases or to 
a more flexible, organic, and evolutionary common law.   Tax law is often 
given as an example of the former, but in the domain of statutory 
intellectual property, copyright provides the best example of statutory 
fragmentation to address special cases.  In part, this fragmentation arises 
from the role of special interests in shaping and drafting copyright 
legislation.  But equally true is the vast array of technological media 
through which copying and performance can occur.  The Copyright Act 
responds to rapid technological change in the way works can be copied, 
distributed, performed, displayed, and shared through statutory amendment 
within a scheme that, like the Patent Act, contains broad, general language.   
 
The Patent Act, however, lacks the specialized provisions that define the 
Copyright Act.  In part, this is because the administrative structure of the 
USPTO subsumes such complexity with its field specific review of patent 
applications.  Furthermore, the Patent Act grants the patent owner a broad 
right to prevent all uses of a patented invention.  Consequently, there has 
been less controversy over what constitutes infringement in patent law 
when compared with copyright law, where each technological change leads 
to questions of what does in fact constitute a copy or an adaptation.   Under 
the terms of the Patent Act, if an invention falls within the claims of the 
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patent, then its unauthorized use, whatever form that takes, constitutes 
infringement.  The statutory complexity of the Copyright Act has its 
analogue in the complexity of patent claim drafting and construction rather 
than in patent legislation. 
 
If, for the reasons stated, statutory fragmentation is not how patent law 
develops, then, as Professors Burk and Lemley point out, common law 
development through judicial tailoring to particular circumstances best 
describes the structure of patent law (pp.104-107).  Their book provides 
choice examples from the fashioning of remedies by courts to the judicious 
use of written description, nonobviousness, and utility doctrines to address 
particular industry-specific dilemmas.  As a descriptive matter, Professors 
Burk and Lemley are accurate, and their book does an excellent job of 
delineating and explaining, what I call here, the common law of patent.  To 
be clear, this common law is informed largely by the Patent Act’s language 
and structure, although in many instances doctrines seem to be created by 
judicial imagination.  The written description requirement and the teach-
suggest-motivate test are two examples of the judicial imagination at work 
in the area of patent law.   For reasons of space, I will address the larger 
point raised by Professors Burk and Lemley, which is the normative point 
that this common law, or judge-inspired common law, is a  preferred means 
for reforming patent law.   As a matter of political expediency and 
effectiveness, the argument in favor of patent reform led by the judiciary is 
strong.   Furthermore, if one is concerned with the play of special interest in 
legislation (a concern that Professors Burk and Lemley seem to have), then 
perhaps the judiciary may be less subject to influence for the usual well-
rehearsed reasons (repeat players, openness, narrow focus on discrete 
issues, case by case determination).   
 
But there are two reasons why one needs to be cautious in appealing to the 
judiciary as a vehicle for patent reform, especially within the United States 
environment.  The first is the issue of which court should serve as the 
engine of reform, the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit.  The second is 
the structure of the patent statute itself, with its grant of broad rights to the 
patent owner.  I address each in turn with the goal of refining Professors 
Burk and Lemley’s prescriptive arguments, with which I am largely 
sympathetic. 
 
United States patent law has a structure distinctive from other federal 
regulatory schemes.   Patents are governed both by a specialized agency, the 
USPTO, and a specialized appellate court, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  The U.S. Supreme Court provides 
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overarching review of both the agency and the specialized court, but from a 
generalist perspective.  The Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence ensures 
that the application of patent law is consistent with the Constitutional 
provisions governing congressional power (Article I, Section 1, Clause 8), 
Constitutional provisions on individual rights (enumerated rights, due 
process), and federal statutory provisions, namely the Patent Act and the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  An appeal to the judiciary as the solution to 
the patent crisis raises the question, which court?  Since Professors Burk 
and Lemley argue that the judiciary should provide the necessary tailoring 
of patent law to address industry specific innovation policy, the Federal 
Circuit, because of its specialized mandate, would seem to be the logical 
candidate as judicial reformer.  Most of the examples that Professors Burk 
and Lemley provide are from Federal Circuit opinions.  Of course, they also 
discuss recent Supreme Court cases.  The question is what role does the 
Supreme Court, as a generalist court, play in tailoring patent law desirably. 
 
A first impression is that the Supreme Court plays little role in such 
tailoring.  Consequently, one may conclude that the Supreme Court should 
largely stay out of the review of patent law, deferring to the Federal Circuit 
except in rare instances.  The recent spate of Supreme Court patent 
decisions would be, under this view, a mistake.   I think this conclusion 
would be wrong.  The Supreme Court can provide guidance in how the 
Federal Circuit can tailor patent law by establishing baselines for defining 
the contours of the patent grant.  Rules on the scope of patent injunctions, 
restrictions on licensing practice, and standing to challenge patent validity 
are all areas in which the Supreme Court has recently intervened.  They are 
also areas where the Court usefully provides guidance on how patent law 
can be shaped for the purposes of tailoring by the Federal Circuit.   For 
example, the Court’s pronouncement on patent injunctions established a 
broad standard-like approach that can be shaped to the context of a 
particular industry.   The correctness of the Supreme Court’s patent 
jurisprudence can be gauged by how well they guide the tailoring role of the 
Federal Circuit.   Such a framework can be useful in cutting through the 
institutional tension between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit that 
is so transparent.  The path to the current case of Bilski v Kappos offers a 
clear example of this tension.  The Federal Circuit’s majority opinion in 
Bilski was obsequious in demonstrating that its ostensibly radical decision 
was well in line with Supreme Court precedent on patentable subject matter.  
The tone of the majority decision could be interpreted as saying either that 
Supreme Court precedent forced the Federal Circuit’s decision or that the 
Supreme Court should grant the resulting petition for certiorari.  The 
Supreme Court, of course, accepted the challenge.  I am hoping that the 
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Court’s final opinion is one that allows for flexibility by the Federal Circuit 
in shaping rules of patentable subject matter that can be tailored to the needs 
of various industries.  Most likely, what this tailoring would involve is 
allowing fairly broad subject matter with well defined limitations on 
patenting abstract ideas or other subject matter that might interfere with 
industry specific innovation. 
 
What is missing however in Burk and Lemley’s appeal to the judiciary is 
not only an analysis of how to allocate Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
functions, but also the role of a specialized agency in effectively tailoring 
patent law.  The 2007 foray by the USPTO into patent reform has arguably 
proven to be a disaster.7   The patent bar successfully moved through the 
Federal Circuit to dull these reform efforts.  But the lesson from this venture 
is not that the USPTO should not be a vehicle for reform.  The lesson is that 
the agency needs to choose its reform policies carefully.   Furthermore, the 
judiciary can play an important role in shaping how the agency operates.  
On this point, the Supreme Court’s failed efforts in KSR v. Teleflex8 were a 
missed opportunity for shaping administrative reform.   There is a good case 
to be made that the Federal Circuit’s approach to nonobviousness under the 
teach-suggest-motivate approach was too rigid and placed too high a burden 
on those who wanted to challenge an invention as being obvious. The 
Supreme Court’s response, however, was to replace a rigid approach with 
an unstructured one.  A more appropriate approach would be to substitute a 
rebuttable presumption for the rigid rule, much as the Court has done in the 
past in the area of prosecution history estoppel.  Creating a rebuttal 
presumption of obviousness would allocate the burden of proof equitably, 
provide guidance for the agency and practitioners, and allow the agency to 
tailor nonobviousness doctrine to the needs of particular industries.  Instead, 
the KSR decision provides a cautionary example against too much reliance 
on the judiciary as the vehicle for reform. 
 
A second gloss on the role of the judiciary in shaping reform stems from the 
language of the Patent Act.  In most jurisdictions, the patent owner is given 
wide latitude in enjoining all unauthorized uses of the patented invention.  
Unlike copyright law, which enumerates specific uses, patent law gives a 
broad grant of exclusivity.  At the heart of Professors Burk and Lemley’s 
argument is the need to tailor this broad grant to the realities of particular 
industries and technologies (pp.62-65).  But with respect to protecting the 
patent owner’s right to enjoin all uses, the Federal Circuit has been more of 
a problem than a solution, particularly in the area of licensing.  The problem 
I am thinking of is the conditional sale doctrine, which allows a patent 
owner to place conditions of use on a patent license.9  What is troubling 
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about this doctrine is the ability of the patent owner to enforce violations of 
such conditions as patent infringement (with attendant treble damages and 
other remedies) as opposed to contract breach.  The conditional sale 
doctrine rests on the assumption that the patent owner’s broad power to 
license use includes a more narrow power to license use subject to 
conditions.  While this may seem to be a logical corollary from contract, the 
problem is that the conditional sale doctrine can turn uses ancillary to the 
use of the invention into patent infringement.  For example, the conditional 
sale doctrine has been extended to limit the right to reuse a patented 
invention or to even repair it, in the ordinary sense of the word repair.  The 
conditional sale doctrine turns ordinary contractual transactions into issues 
of federal patent law.  Consequently, the Federal Circuit has created its own 
contract law jurisprudence in enforcing the conditional sale doctrine, a 
move that takes the court beyond its expertise as a patent court.  Through 
the conditional sale doctrine, the Federal Circuit has expanded the reach of 
patent law and arguably the scope of its own authority.  Fortunately, the 
Supreme Court has partially reined in the influence of the conditional sale 
doctrine, in the case of reach-through license terms, through its patent and 
antitrust informed decision in Quanta v. LG Electronics.10  Nonetheless, the 
conditional sale doctrine provides another example of how the judiciary 
may be as much a problem as a solution. 
 
Professors Burk and Lemley’s book is a must-read because of its 
provocative ideas.  More importantly, their ideas provide a beacon of reason 
and intelligence in what has been a complex mess of patent reform.  
Published in a year that has shown how convoluted legislative reform often 
is, this engaging book shows how it is possible to have politics and reform 
that is potentially free of the byzantine web of influence and diatribe that 
can best be described as political paranoia.   I hope it finds an audience and 
becomes a model for how to think about legislative reform more broadly. 
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7 See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing the 
background on reform efforts by the USPTO). 
8  See footnote 6, supra. 
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For at least the past decade, the question of how well the patent system has 
been promoting innovation has been a question of intense judicial, 
legislative, scholarly, and popular debate.  But all too often, that debate has 
foundered in a morass of rhetoric and anecdote about heroic small 
inventors, unscrupulous copyists, parasitic “patent trolls,” and other colorful 
characters.  With PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS BUT INNOVATORS AT RISK, James Bessen and 
Michael Meurer’s aim is to cut through the rhetoric, and provide a 
comprehensive, empirical evaluation of the patent system to inform the 
debate about patent reform.  To do so, they draw not only on their own 
econometric studies, but also on dozens of other legal, historical, and 
economic studies from other researchers. From their analysis emerge two 
central, and radical, claims about the performance of the patent system.  
First, although some industries fare batter than others, the costs imposed on 
defendants by patent litigation now exceed the value of patents to their 
owners. Thus, rather than stimulating innovation, patents on the whole 
operate as a net tax on innovation.  Second, this imbalance emerged largely 
in the 1990s as the result of legal changes – particularly with respect to 
software patents – that have eroded the ability of firms to ascertain whether 
they will be sued for patent infringement.  So long as patents fail to provide 
clear notice of their boundaries, they cannot deliver the benefits we expect 
from a well-functioning patent system. 
 
Bessen and Meurer’s critique stands out from the ongoing clamor about the 
patent system on two grounds.  The first is its reliance on hard empirical 
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 data. Traditionally, discussions of patent policy have taken place in an 
economic vacuum. When asked by Congress in 1958 to evaluate the 
economics of the patent system, economist Fritz Machlup famously 
confessed to economists’ ignorance of the costs and benefits of a patent 
system: “If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on 
the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to 
recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a 
long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, 
to recommend abolishing it”.1  Though there is no necessary correlation 
between social cost and social benefit for any one patent, few critics have 
questioned the underlying intuition that countries benefit from patent 
systems.  But Bessen and Meurer believe that such hopeful ignorance is no 
longer necessary or tenable.  In recent years economists and other 
researchers have been studying the contribution of patents to both patent-
holding firms and national economies, and Bessen and Meurer collect and 
synthesize that data to provide a state of the art econometric evaluation of 
the patent system. 
 
The other distinctive feature of Bessen and Meurer’s analysis is its 
emphasis on the notice function of the patent system.  The particular 
problems with patent notice that Bessen and Meurer highlight will be 
familiar to most patent lawyers, but failure of patent notice has generally 
not been emphasized in most critiques of the patent system.  Both popular 
and scholarly criticisms of the patent system have focused primarily on the 
issue of patent “quality”. These critiques have charged that, hampered by a 
lack of resources and restrictive court decisions, the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) has been issuing too many patents which are not novel and 
non-obvious over the prior art.  And popular critiques in particular have 
vilified non-practicing entities – the so-called “patent trolls” – who exact 
exorbitant settlements or damage awards from companies sued for patent 
infringement.  Bessen and Meurer acknowledge these concerns, but regard 
them as secondary and, in some cases, related to the more central problem 
of patent notice. 
 
Bessen and Meurer’s starting point to evaluate the patent system is the 
theory of property itself:  if we can understand the circumstances where 
property rights succeed  and where they fail, we may be able to understand 
the circumstances under which patents will succeed or fail in promoting 
innovation.  Bessen and Meurer survey the theoretical and empirical 
literature on property rights, showing that “property” is not a magical 
incantation that brings prosperity in its wake (pp.38-45).  Rather, the ways 
in which property rights have been implemented have been critical to their 
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 success or failure.  Property rights can fail where multiple claims overlap, 
or where proliferating property rights make clearance prohibitive, or where 
the legal regime makes it costly to secure, ascertain, or transfer rights. 
 
Do patent rights behave like successful property rights?  In Bessen and 
Meurer’s view, the answer is more and more frequently no.  In their words, 
“If you can’t tell the boundaries, then it ain’t property” (p.46). Unlike real 
or personal property, patents often do not provide clear notice of their scope 
until it is too late.  Innovators are frequently unaware of patents until well 
after their technology has been deployed and their businesses established; in 
other instances, even expert advice on how to avoid known patents can turn 
out to be wrong. 
 
What leads to the failure of patent notice?  Bessen and Meurer identify 
several aspects of the modern patent system that contribute to the failure of 
patent notice.  Claim construction, the use of continuation applications, 
patent law’s disclosure doctrines, and the sheer volume of patents, 
especially on software-related inventions, all make it prohibitively 
expensive to perform clearance review (pp.53-71). 
 
Bessen and Meurer’s analysis then turns empirical.  They first survey the 
existing literature examining the role of patent rights in economic growth.  
Studies of national economic performance have shown good correlations 
between economic growth and legal systems that provide strong property 
rights and facilitate their alienability. But comparisons of national economic 
performance have generally failed to demonstrate a strong or consistent 
correlation between intellectual property rights and economic growth.  
Comparisons across countries are of course fraught with difficulties, 
especially the challenge of quantifying the strength of intellectual property 
protections provided by a particular legal regime.  But in Bessen and 
Meurer’s view, if multiple studies have failed to consistently correlate 
intellectual property rights with economic growth – where studies of other 
kinds of property rights have shown such correlations – we can at least be 
confident that “patents do not deliver the same kind of economic payoff as 
do property rights” (p.92). 
 
The core of Bessen and Meurer’s work, and the aspect of the book that will 
generate the most controversy, is their attempt to measure the costs and 
benefits of the U.S. patent system.  More specifically, Bessen and Meurer 
attempt to measure the value of U.S. patents to their owners, and the costs 
imposed by patent litigation.  They estimate the value of patents to their 
owners by patent renewal data (pp.99-104).  This method relies on the 
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 requirement that patentees must pay renewal fees to keep their patents in 
force.2  Collecting data from all patents owned by U.S. public 
manufacturing firms, Bessen and Meurer deduce a mean value of about 
$113,0003 per U.S. patent issued from 1985 to 19914 (p.102). 
 
Not all industries value  patents similarly, however.  Bessen and Meurer 
show by renewal estimates that the mean value of patents that claim 
molecules or chemical compositions – i.e., most patents in the 
pharmaceutical industry – is almost three times greater than the average 
patent (p.108).  Conversely, patents on “complex technologies”5 tend to be 
less than half as valuable as the average patent (p.108).  Nor is the wealth 
equally shared among large and small companies.  Perhaps contrary to 
rhetoric about the value of patents to small inventors and firms, Bessen and 
Meurer find that patents held by large entities are about 50% more valuable 
than those held by small entities (p.108). 
 
With these values in hand, Bessen and Meurer are in a position for the first 
time to estimate the value patents return to their owners.  Bessen and 
Meurer estimate that patents granted in 1991 are worth about $4.4 billion – 
well in excess of the approximately $1 billion spent to prosecute them 
(p.112).  And patents certainly provide favorable returns to their owners:  
Bessen and Meurer estimate that in 1999 firms in the chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries earned patent rents of about $15.2 billion, while 
other firms earned rents of about $3.2 billion.  Patent attorneys will be 
cheered by Bessen and Meurer’s conclusion:  “On average, patents deliver 
real value and inventors get their money’s worth for the money they pay 
their patent lawyers” (p.112). 
 
But of course, the value of patents only tells half the story.  Bessen and 
Meurer’s unprecedented contribution to the field is their effort to estimate 
the costs of the patent system as well.  For defendants, costs of the patent 
system include not only legal fees and damages assessed against them, but 
the costs associated with having to abandon the patented technology if the 
patentee prevails and secures an injunction.  Even defendants who 
ultimately win suffer losses from customer uncertainty in the interim and 
employee time and company resources dedicated to litigation.  Bessen and 
Meurer estimate these costs by examining how firm’s stock prices respond 
to the filing of an infringement lawsuit. Bessen and Meurer find that, on 
average, publicly traded firms lose almost $29 million upon being sued for 
patent infringement (p.137).  Generally speaking, these losses are not offset 
by corresponding gains to the patentee; the filing of an infringement suit 
also depresses the value of patentee firms, though not to the same extent. 
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When Bessen and Meurer compare the profits firms realize from patents6 to 
the aggregate costs of patent litigation, a startling discrepancy emerges.  For 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, profits from patents 
comfortably exceed aggregate litigation costs (p.139).  However, for firms 
in other industries, patent profits have never significantly exceeded 
litigation costs (p.139).  Moreover, by the mid 1990s soaring litigation costs 
began to substantially exceed patent profits, a trend that continued through 
the end of the century (p.139).  Bessen and Meurer therefore conclude that, 
by the late 1990s, “patents likely provided a net disincentive for the firms 
who fund the lion’s share of industrial R&D; that is, patents tax R&D” 
(p.144).   
 
Why did patent litigation costs begin to exceed patent profits in the mid 
1990s?  Bessen and Meurer believe the answer is the failure of patent 
notice.  It was during this era that the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit made trial court claim constructions a question of law subject to de 
novo review, and permitted patentees to claim inventions such as software 
and business methods without being tied to physical embodiments.7  
Coupled with an increasing volume of patent applications and increasing 
continuation applications, Bessen and Meurer argue that these changes 
substantially eroded the patent system’s notice functions (pp.150 – 151).  
Particularly for software inventions, Bessen and Meurer believe that 
abstractness is to blame for much of the current notice problem (pp.198– 
212). 
 
Bessen and Meurer lay much of the blame for the failure of patent notice on 
the Federal Circuit, which in their view has not provided a predictable 
jurisprudence of claim construction that would provide clear notice of 
patent boundaries.  As do many other commentators, they suggest that the 
appellate court should accord more deference to trial courts and the PTO 
when construing claims, rather than its current practice of reviewing claim 
construction de novo (p. 238).  Somewhat more radically, they suggest that 
the current standard of claim indefiniteness – which upholds the validity of 
claims so long as they are not “insolubly ambiguous” – be strengthened, 
such that any claim with more than one plausible interpretation ought to be 
held invalid (p.239). 
 
Other reforms suggested by Bessen and Meurer include an increased role 
for the PTO in determining patent boundaries:  the PTO ought to issue 
(upon request) infringement opinion letters setting forth the Office’s 
opinion about whether a particular technology infringes are not, and that 
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 such letters be accorded deference by the courts. Bessen and Meurer admit 
they do not have a general solution to the problem of abstract patents.  But 
as a first step they suggest that software patents be treated to a heightened 
standard of enablement, similar to the one applied to many biotechnological 
inventions, in which the inventor’s claims are limited more closely to the 
technology actually disclosed in the patent (p.245). 
 
Without question, Bessen and Meurer’s work provides an invaluable 
synthesis of leading economic research on patents, and succeeds in moving 
the debate about the patent system beyond the anecdotal.  The scope and 
ambition of Bessen and Meurer’s book, ands its provocative conclusions, 
will unquestionably guarantee it a central role in future debates about the 
patent system.  In that spirit, I will focus on a few aspects of their analysis 
that are likely to prove controversial and spur further research and debate. 
 
The empirical core of Bessen and Meurer’s work is their estimation of the 
value and costs of the patent system.  Bessen and Meurer acknowledge that 
their measurements of patent value are subject to a number of 
uncertainties.8 But the more serious question lies in their use of event study 
data to measure the costs that patent litigation imposes on publicly traded 
firms.  Bessen and Meurer base their measurement of lost value on the price 
of the defendant’s stock within 24 days of the filing of a lawsuit.  Naive 
observers might wonder whether subsequent events – for example, the 
defendant ultimately prevailing in the suit – might later reverse some of 
these losses.  It is one thing to conclude that such changes accurately 
represent the short-term losses to a firm’s shareholders; it is quite another to 
say that they accurately represent the long-term aggregate costs of patent 
litigation.  To do so requires a great deal of faith in the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis:  namely, that investors’ short-term reaction to an infringement 
lawsuit accurately measures the lawsuit’s ultimate effect on firm 
profitability.  That assumption has not, to my knowledge, been empirically 
validated.  To the contrary, according to some critics, the stock market’s 
short-term reaction to patent judgments may exceed by an order of 
magnitude the losses measured by any reasonable estimate of future 
returns.9  Moreover, Bessen and Meurer’s observation that the loss in 
defendant’s market value is not offset by a corresponding gain in the 
plaintiff’s market value does not necessarily demonstrate that “the 
combined wealth of the two sides to the lawsuit decreases”10 (p.137). 
 
These criticisms do not undermine many of Bessen and Meurer’s important 
findings: that the balance of patent value and costs is far more favorable in 
the chemical and pharmaceutical fields than in other industries, or that the 
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 perceived costs of litigation for firms outside those industries has soared 
since the mid-1990s.  But without knowing whether short-term market 
reaction accurately measures the real costs of patent litigation, Bessen and 
Meurer’s most ambitious and sensational conclusion – that the current 
patent system operates as a net tax on innovation outside the pharmaceutical 
industry – remains unproven. 
 
Whether or not the absolute costs of the patent system outweigh its benefits, 
Bessen and Meurer make a compelling case that uncertainty plays a major 
part in its escalating costs, and other difficulties as well.  The question is 
what to do about it.  As do many other commentators, Bessen and Meurer 
view claim construction as a question at least partly based in fact, on which 
the Federal Circuit ought to defer to the district court’s determination of 
claim boundaries.  Of course if we take seriously Bessen and Meurer’s 
argument that patents need to work more like real property, we might note 
that interpreting deeds, grants, and other documents defining real property 
boundaries is generally considered a question of law and subject to de novo 
review11 – as it is in the current claim construction regime.  More 
importantly, as Bessen and Meurer acknowledge,12district courts would not 
necessarily set more predictable claim boundaries than the appellate court 
does.  If patents are to work as property, boundaries must be predictable 
before litigation.  For the defendant who discovers only at trial that he is 
within the boundaries of the claims, it would be little consolation to know 
that the verdict against him will likely be upheld on appeal.  A district 
court’s claim construction, shaped by the idiosyncratic process of a 
particular trial, might well be less predictable ex ante than the Federal 
Circuit’s, in which case we should not be too concerned about preserving 
the district court’s decision – which is, after all, only the penultimate step in 
a long process of patent litigation.13 
 
Bessen and Meurer also propose that the PTO reject as indefinite any 
ambiguous claim.  But even assuming we wish to devote that much effort to 
the vast majority of patents that will never be litigated, the problem with 
patent claims is that they are vague rather than an ambiguous.14 Just as most 
contracts will prove incomplete when some contingency not anticipated by 
the parties arises, nearly every patent claim will prove vague when put to 
the test.15 
 
These criticisms aside, Bessen and Meurer have produced a landmark work 
that will prove useful and thought-provoking for legal scholars and other 
academics, but will also find a place on the shelf of non-specialists who 
The IP Law Book Review 22 
 The IP Law Book Review 23 
                                                
care about the future of the patent system and its role in fostering (or 
hindering, if Bessen and Meurer are to believed) the process of innovation. 
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1  Fritz Machlup, Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and 
Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., An 
Economic Review of the Patent System 80 (Comm. Print 1958) 
 
2 If a patent owner declines to pay the renewal fee, we know that the owner 
values the patent less than the cost of renewal. 
 
3 All of Bessen and Meurer’s valuations are expressed in constant 1992 
dollars. 
 
4 This estimate is roughly in line with parallel measurements Bessen and 
Meurer derive using another technique based on the market value of patent-
holding firms.  In these studies, complex regression techniques estimate the 
contribution of patents to a firm’s market value, attempting to separate out 
the contributions patents make from other contributors to firm value such as 
physical assets and unpatented research and development.  Bessen and 
Meurer estimate that from 1979 to 1997, public firms that conduct research 
and development derived about $370,000 in market value per U.S. patent 
owned (p.105). Because the market regressions do not discriminate between 
the contributions of domestic and foreign patents to firm value, the estimate 
of $113,000 per patent seems reasonable if we assume that the worldwide 
patent portfolios of U.S. firms are 2 to 3 times more valuable than their U.S. 
patents alone. The market regression technique estimates the total value of 
patent assets, which are detected by their ability to yield supra-competitive 
profits, as compared to other assets which yield competitive returns.  By 
expressing this value in terms of the value per U.S. patent, Bessen and 
Meurer seem to assume that the return on foreign patent assets is 
proportional to the number of U.S. patents held by the firm. 
 
5 Defined as those in which a single infringement case invokes patents from 
multiple technology groups. 
 
6 Bessen and Meurer estimate patent profits by first calculating the value of 
worldwide patent assets using the firm market value method, and then 
assuming a 15% rate of return on those assets (p.114). 
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7 Of course the Federal Circuit’s recent Bilksi decision reversed the court’s 
willingness to permit patents on intangible processes. 
 
8 The major complication in estimating patent values by renewal data is that 
the value of the most important patents – the 40% that are renewed through 
their full term – cannot be observed;  all we know is that their owners value 
them more than the cost of renewal.  The solution is to assume that the 
unobserved patents follow the same distribution of the observed patents 
(p.115).  While it is not clear this assumption is justified, Bessen and 
Meurer use the more generous firm market value method in their 
comparison of value and cost (p.140). 
 
9 See Glynn S. Lunney, On the Continuing Misuse of Event Studies:  The 
Example of Bessen and Meurer, 16 J. Intell. Prop. 35, 48-50 (2008). 
 
10 Studies examining other forms of litigation have also found that market 
value losses to defendants greatly exceed gains to plaintiffs.  See id. at 
41(reviewing event studies). Bessen and Meurer assume this discrepancy 
measures deadweight losses in patent litigation, such as legal costs and 
diversion of managerial resources, as well as possible transfers of wealth 
from the involved firms to rivals and consumers.  But a simple thought 
experiment suggests that the same reaction would be expected even if 
litigation efficiently transferred wealth from defendants to plaintiffs.  
Suppose Firm A sues Firm B, and investors perceive a certain probability 
that Firm A will pay Firm B a certain amount.  Behavioral experiments 
have long shown that people disvalue probabilistic losses more than they 
value probabilistic gains. Investors will therefore disvalue possible losses in 
B’s stock more than they will value possible gains in A’s stock, even if they 
perceive the potential transfer of wealth from B to A to be costless.  Hence, 
losses in B’s value will exceed gains in A’s value regardless of deadweight 
loss.  One can of course dismiss such criticisms by assuming that investors 
are immune from cognitive bias, but then once again the validity of Bessen 
and Meurer’s conclusions depend strongly on assumptions of market 
efficiency. 
 
11 See C.J.S. Boundaries § 222; Am Jur 2d. Boundaries § 112. 
 
12 Bessen and Meurer pp.237-38. 
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13 See generally Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the 
Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. Miami. L. Rev. 1033 (2007).  
At the least, it would seem more feasible to predict the actions of the dozen 
or so Federal Circuit judges, as compared to the difficulty of forecasting the 
actions of the hundreds of district court judges who might potentially 
preside over a case.  The problem of predicting the actions of the appellate 
court would presumably worsen if jurisdiction over patent appeals was 
divided among multiple appellate courts, as Bessen and Meurer suggest 
(pp.230-31).  Bessen and Meurer seem to believe that multiple appellate 
courts would produce a better jurisprudence of claim construction, which 
would outweigh the unpredictability associated with multiple courts 
(p.231).  It is not immediately apparent, however, why multiple courts 
would evolve more a predictable jurisprudence of claim construction than 
the Federal Circuit has.  The only other court that has wrestled with patent 
issues since the creation of the Federal Circuit – the United States Supreme 
Court – has consistently favored looser, standards-based approaches over 
the Federal Circuit’s bright line rules. 
 
14 For example, in the Federal Circuit’s pivotal Phillips case on claim 
construction, the underlying dispute before the en banc court was not over 
some esoteric scientific term, but whether wall partitions described as 
“baffles” had to be angled with respect to the wall, or whether the term 
could encompass perpendicular partitions as well.  See Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1309-11 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).  This is a 
question of vagueness rather than ambiguity, and very likely neither the 
patentee nor the examiner was conscious of this vagueness during 
prosecution.  And if they were, a host of other questions could have arisen:  
could very thin or very thick partitions be “baffles”?  Could they have holes 
in them rather than be solid?  Need they extend the full height of the wall? 
 
15 Bessen and Meurer also suggest that software claims might be reined in 
by treating them as an “unpredictable” technology, thereby subjecting them 
to a heightened enablement requirement (p.245).  But if we are seeking to 
“limit[] claims more closely to the technology that the patent actually 
discloses” (p.245), then the question is not enablement – whether one of 
ordinary skill in the art could make and use the subject matter defined by 
the claims – but rather written description: whether the patentee has 
described in the disclosure the subject matter delineated in the claims.  It is 
somewhat peculiar that throughout PATENT FAILURE Bessen and Meurer 
highlight the problem of confining the patentee to what he invented or 
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“possessed,” but refer exclusively to enablement when discussing patent 
disclosure.  It may be that Bessen and Meurer did not wish to become 
embroiled in the controversy over whether § 112 contained a written 
description requirement separate from enablement.   The en banc Federal 
Circuit recently confirmed the existence of an independent written 
description requirement in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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Jessica Reyman’s THE RHETORIC OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE REGULATION OF DIGITAL CULTURE 
is a book whose time has come. As a book about the rhetorical divide 
between the content industry and copyright activists, it analyzes the deep 
rifts between the language of incentives and exclusivity and the 
counterdiscourse of cooperation and the commons. And as a piece about the 
upheaval in the socio-legal landscape of intellectual property rights, it is in 
good company. There are multitudes of recent books and articles that seek a 
solution to the divide that animates disputes about owners and users (many 
of whom Reyman cites, so I won’t cite here). What Reyman does that is 
different from the developing scholarship on the “second enclosure 
movement”1 is focus on a solution based on language rather than regulation. 
Recognizing that language is power – that rhetoric constitutes the culture 
we inhabit – Reyman analyzes in eight very manageable chapters the 
discursive landscape of the intellectual property culture wars and proposes a 
grammar for its armistice. 
 
Reyman considers the discursive battle as one being fought over competing 
values: “one of control, which relies heavily on comparisons of intellectual 
property to physical property and emphasizes ownership, theft, and piracy; 
and another the value of community participation, seen in the 
implementation of new concepts such as that of an intellectual ‘commons,’ 
which emphasizes exchange, collaboration, and responsibility to a public 
good” (p.5). Reyman sees in the opposing discourses a potentially 
insurmountable problem of irreconcilability. In some very recent articles, 
intellectual property scholars have said similar things.2 James Grimmelman, 
for example, describes an ambiguity in the language of sharing and the 
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commons that could either be harmonized with the default ethical vision of 
copyright (a model of voluntary commercial exchange) or could be in 
tension with that default vision. This ambiguity threatens the copyleft 
movement and potentially entrenches the default vision further.  
Grimmelman ends his essay with some suggestions for getting beyond the 
impasse, suggestions that Reyman was already taking up in the writing of 
her book: “We can complicate our conversations about copy norms by 
studying how ethical rhetoric is used to build up norms and to tear them 
down. We can craft more compelling copyright reforms by framing them in 
ethically appealing ways.”3  Reyman’s book is a study of the ethical 
rhetoric and a proposal for the reframing of that language to take advantage 
of the “democratic potential of a networked society” (p.25). 
 
Central to Reyman’s project is the notion that language constitutes our 
world. “[L]anguage … does not reflect intrinsic values or represent a fixed, 
objective truth about copyright law but rather constitutes the meaning and 
values arising from the specific conditions of a particular time in the history 
of cultural production” (p.26).  Building from Foucault’s Archaeology of 
Knowledge and The Order of Things, Reyman describes a theoretical 
structure of discourse, power, and resistance through which she understands 
the copyright debates, specifically “how legal structures for copyright law 
are reified and resisted through acts of discourse, and how meaning is 
negotiated among dispersed points of power in the digital copyright debate” 
(p.34).  Onto this, she adds a layer of narrative theory and metaphor that 
shape the copyright wars, drawing on scholars such as James Boyd White, 
Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, Debora Halbert, Phillip Eubanks, 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson as guidance.  
 
Reyman does not need to convince me that language constitutes our culture 
and thus that legal reform can and must happen through self-conscious 
crafting of our aspirations with words, slogans, and stories. I have spent all 
of my professional academic life making a case for the interdisciplinary 
approach to law as the inevitable mode of advocacy and reform.4 I have 
always found it ironic that in a discipline and practice so deeply entwined 
with the literary, law ferociously maintains its purity from other disciplines. 
This is the by-now well-known argument of Stanley Fish, picked up by 
others, that “law wishes to have a formal existence.”5 The eruption of the 
“law and…” disciplines since the 1980s and the particular dominance of 
some of the fields today (e.g., law and economics or law and history) has 
dashed the hopes of law for its immunity to other fields.   
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Reyman’s good book is yet another example of why legal analysis cannot 
and should not be undertaken without recourse to a diversified set of 
intellectual tools. With this book and her lens of rhetoric and composition 
studies, she has helped us better understand how certain legal arguments 
become entrenched and how we might find our way out of the trenches. If I 
were to offer any sustained critique of the book, it would be that it does not 
draw on the literature devoted to systematizing the cultural analysis of law.6 
This literature could bridge the gap between discourse theory and 
organizational behavior (between the language of the law and the way legal 
actors or systems interact with each other). A cultural analysis approach, 
drawing on theories of cultural production or the sociology of organizations, 
might more thoroughly connect individual language choices and social 
structure. It may help explain more “thickly” how singular cases, such as 
MGM Studios v. Grokster (the subject of Reyman’s Chapter 6), aggregate to 
instantiate systemic institutional power.7  
 
Nonetheless, THE RHETORIC OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY is a 
well conceived book. It proceeds logically in eight chapters with two 
helpful appendices.  Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the overarching concept of 
the project and make the case for the usefulness of a study of rhetoric to 
understanding the law and policy of digital copyright for society.  Chapter 3 
begins a historical discussion of U.S. copyright law as it comes into conflict 
with the digital age. Chapter 3 is geared toward those less familiar with 
copyright than intellectual property lawyers and scholars, but the clear 
prose, short length and helpful subsections make it a very readable and 
teachable chapter in this book.  
 
Chapter 4 pulls from the content owner industry (mostly the music and 
movie industries) a dominant narrative of the importance of individual 
reward that is linked to the artificial creation of scarcity through intellectual 
property rights. Reyman calls this the “property stewardship narrative” 
(p.59).  Digital technology arises in conflict with this narrative as a method 
for disseminating without pay and thus allegedly destroying the facilitation 
of cultural production. This chapter, along with Chapter 5, reconnects with 
Chapter 2’s articulation of rhetorical forms and functions to demonstrate 
how the content industry’s discourse develops characters and story 
structures describing “victimized businesses versus predatory technology 
developers and their opportunistic consumers” (p.59). Reyman also 
describes frequent metaphors used in the content industries’ persuasive 
stories of just ownership and exclusion, such as that novels are like land or 
copyists are like pirates (p.67).  The data for Chapter 4 draws from court 
filings, public relation campaigns and promotional materials.  
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Chapter 5 focuses on the rhetoric of the counterdiscourse as built around the 
metaphor of “the commons” and as building up a narrative of “the cultural 
conservancy” (p.75). Chapter 5 highlights the counterdiscourse’s core 
principle that digital networks and open access enhance democracy and 
social welfare (p.89). Reyman concludes this chapter by critiquing the 
ambiguity in the “cultural conservancy” narrative. She says that it  
insufficiently distinguishes between consuming copyrighted content for free 
and accessing that content to build up an information commons (pp.24, 92). 
This threatens the movement’s moral righteousness and its logical integrity. 
She also says that the counterdiscourse might fail because of its lack of fit 
with actual practices of peer-to-peer filing sharing (p.93).8 Data for Chapter 
5 is drawn from organizational literature, scholarship and court filings. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 are case studies illustrating the conflicting narratives 
outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 examines the rhetoric of MGM 
Studios v. Grokster –  the case, the court documents, and the news coverage. 
This chapter highlights the competing values in Grokster exemplified by the 
“property stewardship” and the “cultural conservancy” narratives. Reyman 
asserts in this chapter that traditional intellectual property law furthers its 
narrative coherence by (1) eliding creative activity with monetary incentives 
and (2) oversimplifying complex cultural networks as the binary 
relationship between business person (author) and consumer (reader) 
(pp.97, 112).  These refinements of the rhetoric of the intellectual property 
wars are important contributions to understanding the resistance to narrative 
change in law generally. Reyman shows how the legal stories of justice and 
desert are rooted in part on deep structural myths in our culture of 
individual incentives, consensual business relations, and creativity 
originating for individuals rather than groups.9  Chapter 7 picks up this 
theme and focuses on the RIAA and MPAA anti-piracy campaigns.  
Relying on public relations material and promotional advertising, this 
chapter discusses the campaign narratives that “teach[] respect [for private 
property]” and virtuous digital citizenship, framing these stories as about 
anti-theft rather than about control or anti-access.  As in Chapter 6, Chapter 
7 demonstrates how the “property stewardship” narrative builds upon the 
binary of owner and consumer and culminates in the resolution of the 
consumer as ethical digital citizen who protects the future of art by 
compensating the artist (p.131).  Both of these chapters could stand on their 
own as independent essays to illuminate Grokster or the anti-piracy 
campaigns. They nonetheless fit nicely into the book’s progression and 
demonstrate the logic of the intellectual property wars as built on well-
defined and competing rhetorical structures.  
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Chapter 8, “Toward a New Rhetoric of Copyright: Defining the Future of 
Cultural Production,” is a collection of thoughts on the weaknesses of the 
second enclosure movement as well as some broad suggestions for 
facilitating its advancement. Reyman suggests that we refocus the debate on 
users of technology (not a new idea, but certainly a good one) and the 
contextualization of use as either helpful or harmful. Technology is not 
neutral, she reminds us; it can be used for good or for ill. Counteracting the 
default intellectual property discourse with the bald statement that 
“technological advances are signs of progress” will not satisfy the 
traditionalists. Reyman’s more interesting contribution to the advancement 
of the access movement is to highlight its diverse and dispersed 
participatory base (p.140).  She calls for more specific examples of harm 
caused by denial of access, examples that can serve as the cornerstones of 
new stories about why and how the commons and sharing are the preferred 
modes for both artists and audiences. Voices need to be “user-based” and 
“unified” around these examples that express a need for digital 
technologies, such as peer-to-peer  (p.148).  She also calls for more precise 
descriptions of the practices of cultural production that rely on digital 
sharing and mixing and a clearer articulation of the good these technologies 
produce (148). “[T]echnology developers and copyright activities face the 
very serious challenge of having not only to present a compelling argument 
regarding the utility of digital technology for cultural production, but they 
also have to define and defend a cultural shift in values in cultural 
production” (p.141).  This reminds me of Julie Cohen’s very smart warning 
that the success of the movement requires at least two things: to “do the 
science” (produce detailed descriptions of cultural environment the 
movement seeks to obtain) and “generate a normative theory … a story 
about what makes th[e] [cultural environment that this movement creates] 
good.”10  Reyman hasn’t done the science in this book, but she contributes 
to the growing call to action, which can only help the success of the 
movement actors, as long as they are paying attention. 
 
In the end, I am not sure that changing the language of intellectual property 
rights from exclusivity to sharing, and from private ownership to the 
commons, is enough to shift perceptions and values that undergird our 
regulatory schemes. I do think it is one important facet of that change, 
however. And I am convinced that narrative structure facilitates the strength 
of the dominant legal regime as much as I believe that a really good 
counternarrative might lend doubt to the dominant story’s truth.11  
Importantly, I do not think that wholesale changing of our language – a 
counterdiscourse – can produce a revolution in baseline assumptions about 
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the value of and motivation for cultural production.12 What can – and has – 
achieved revolutionary change is the ground-up development and 
incremental expansion of non-profit organizations and initiatives, such as 
Creative Commons (whose licenses number 130 million after only seven 
years) and open access initiatives as the default policy for institutions and 
governmental bodies (see, e.g., the National Institute of Heath’s Open 
Access Policy).  Contrary to the court cases, which are often narrow 
victories and limited to particular circumstances, and legislative reform, 
which can take decades and require a perfect confluence of political factors, 
institutional transformation or organizational founding can occur readily 
with small numbers of individuals and relatively small capital output.13 The 
catch is that these changes happen in situ – already in relation to the 
existing formal or informal organizational structures or constraints that have 
built into them traditional intellectual property default rules and values.  But 
when culture is in contention, as it is in terms of the access movements and 
intellectual property’s future, truly engaging with the situation may be the 
best way to be heard.14 
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In California’s high-tech economy, protection of trade secrets has always 
been critical to companies whose stock in trade is their intellectual capital, 
especially given that agreements not to compete will typically run afoul of 
California law.  In today’s difficult business environment it is more 
important than ever for companies to hang on to their know-how to avoid 
losing in a zero sum game.  Lawyers advising California companies, 
therefore, must have a firm grasp of California’s trade secret laws.    
 
California business and intellectual property attorneys will be well served to 
add TRADE SECRET LITIGATION AND PROTECTION IN 
CALIFORNIA (2nd ed.) to their reference libraries.  This 25-chapter book 
published by the Intellectual Property Section of the State Bar of California 
covers almost every aspect of trade secret protection in California – and 
then some.  Co-editors Randall E. Kay and Rebecca Edelson have 
assembled a team of 26 authors to pen chapters ranging from the most basic 
question, “What is a trade secret?,” to providing detailed guidance on how 
to protect trade secrets when contracting with the federal government.  
 
According to the State Bar, TRADE SECRET LITIGATION AND 
PROTECTION IN CALIFORNIA has been updated to include references to 
65 new trade secret cases decided since the first edition was published in 
2005.  The book also boasts a discussion of trade secret preemption 
(pp.161-165), which was recently clarified by the Court of Appeal in K.C. 
Multimedia, Inc. v. Bank of America Tech. & Ops., Inc.,1 as well as new 
chapters on trade secret licensing (Chapter 24) and the protection of ideas 
not qualifying as trade secrets (Chapter 25).  The licensing chapter is one of 
the book’s longest, dissecting each element of a typical license, providing 
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an understandable rationale for that element, and providing sample 
language for the attorney wishing to incorporate those elements into an 
agreement.  Although somewhat out of place in a book about trade secrets, 
the chapter on idea protection is a nice introduction to the law of implied 
contractual obligations – which can often contradict the notion that ideas are 
free.  
 
The book’s opening chapters provide a primer on trade secret law and 
present a practically organized research guide for any attorney considering 
the basic question of whether there is, in fact, a trade secret worthy of 
protection.  Chapter 1 defines the meaning of the term “trade secret” and 
then goes on methodically to provide dozens of specific, bullet-pointed 
examples of information that the courts have determined are (and are not) 
trade secrets, complete with a summary of the courts’ reasoning.  Chapter 1 
also provides similar case-specific illustrations where courts have 
determined whether information can be considered “secret,” along with a 
host of other threshold questions.  Chapter 2 takes up where the first chapter 
leaves off, providing a detailed overview of what it means to 
“misappropriate” information.  
 
The core of TRADE SECRET LITIGATION AND PROTECTION IN 
CALIFORNIA, however, is the seven chapters focused specifically on 
procedures and strategies for prosecuting and defending trade secret 
litigation in court (Chapters 6-12).  These chapters address everything from 
preparation of the initial pleadings to obtaining damages and other civil 
remedies.  The authors have usefully distilled general principles as they 
relate to trade secrets so that the practitioner can easily find them in one 
place.  Interestingly, however, despite recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
heightening requirements for pleading sufficient facts in a complaint,2 the 
authors do not discuss what impact this line of cases might have on trade 
secret claims brought in federal court.  The authors include only a “bare 
bones” template for drafting a trade secret complaint, which seems unlikely 
to pass muster under the altered pleading landscape now operative in federal 
courts.   
 
Importantly, TRADE SECRET LITIGATION AND PROTECTION IN 
CALIFORNIA dedicates two chapters to critical issues in the handling, 
preservation, and disclosure of trade secrets during the course of litigation 
(Chapters 8-9).  This section will be of great interest to even the most 
experienced civil litigators, since the conflicting interests of trade secret 
plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts have made this area one of the most 
hotly contested aspects of trade secret litigation.  The authors have 
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succeeded in providing a practical roadmap for navigating through this 
treacherous landscape. 
 
The two chapters on litigation remedies outline the basic legal framework 
that will govern attempts to obtain preliminary and permanent injunctions, 
as well provide an overview of the types of damages that a plaintiff can 
obtain in a trade secret misappropriation case.  In the chapter on injunctions 
(Chapter 10), the authors walk the reader through each element required to 
obtain an injunction and provide strategies that both plaintiffs and 
defendants can use to prevail.  The chapter on damages (Chapter 11) is even 
more useful, taking the time to explore both basic and more creative 
damages theories and summarizing the courts’ reasoning in accepting or 
rejecting those theories.  Simple summaries of these cases provide useful 
context for a trade secret plaintiff to understand the scope of its losses (and 
how to prove them).  
 
The editors have also included several “how to” chapters on topics such as 
setting up a trade secret protection program at a high-tech company, dealing 
with exiting employees, and contracting with the government.  These 
chapters (two of which are penned by corporate counsel at major 
technology companies) provide step-by-step best practices for obtaining 
specific objectives, without getting lost in theoretical legal clutter.  For 
example, the chapter on trade secret protection programs (Chapter 3) begins 
by discussing the benefits of a trade secret protection program and then 
laying out the contents of such a program, describing how to implement it at 
a company, and providing a list of helpful checklist of “do’s and don’ts” 
that summarize what has come before.  Similarly, a chapter on employment 
law issues (Chapter 4) contains some very useful tips attorneys can use 
when preparing nondisclosure agreements and avoiding illegal non-compete 
contracts.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the genesis of many trade secret disputes – departing 
employees – and provides concrete steps an employer can take when an 
employee leaves to either (1) minimize the risk that the departing employee 
will try to compete with stolen trade secrets or (2) lay the evidentiary 
foundation for a compelling trade secret misappropriation claim.  This 
chapter provides a brief overview of a key employee’s exit interview and 
maps out the considerations a corporate client should go through in deciding 
whether to file suit.  Although quite brief, this chapter gives the busy in-
house attorney a framework within which to consider these issues.    
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Because Chapter 5 (like a few other chapters) does not contain legal 
citations, however, it is impossible to test the validity of some of its legal 
assertions.  Of course, this approach is great for simplifying the discussion, 
but may lead to some confusion.  For example, the author of this chapter 
states as a matter of fact that “any civil proceeding you might want to 
initiate would be stayed pending the outcome of a criminal case” (pp.137-
138).  Although the author cites to Chapters 13 through 18 (dealing with the 
criminal aspects of trade secret law), nothing in those chapters suggests that 
a stay of civil proceedings is inevitable when a criminal case is also 
instituted (even if, in practice, this is the typical result).   
 
This points up one of the book’s biggest flaws: allowing multiple authors to 
address overlapping issues without the kind of internal consistency that a 
single author typically brings to a unified work.  For example, both 
Chapters 8 and 9 contain somewhat repetitive discussions of the trade secret 
disclosure requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.210,3 
such that the reader sees the same quotations and same case citations in 
support of the same legal points over the course of two chapters.  Of course, 
even though working with multiple authors is challenging, the editors 
should address these issues in any future edition of the book.  
 
The book’s six chapters on criminal trade secret litigation (Chapters 13-18), 
in contrast, are written by authors who succeed in laying out the basic legal 
and statutory framework of criminal trade secret liability without too much 
repetition.  An introductory chapter (Chapter 13) provides an overview of 
this specialized area of law, followed by in-depth discussion of criminal 
trade secret misappropriation under Penal Code section 499c,4 California’s 
unauthorized access to computers statute under Penal Code section 502,5 
and the federal Economic Espionage Act of 1996.6  These chapters provide 
a useful primer for attorneys interested in criminal aspects of trade secret 
law – including criminal defense attorneys and corporate counsel.   
 
For attorneys considering whether to pursue criminal prosecution, the book 
includes a chapter weighing the pros and cons of seeking criminal 
prosecution (Chapter 17) and a chapter analyzing how a victim of trade 
secret theft can interest the government in pursuing a case against the 
perpetrator (Chapter 16).  Although this chapter contains some practical 
discussion, more guidance as to what might go into a “briefing book” to 
persuade prosecutors into pursuing criminal trade secret cases would have 
been helpful.   
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Even where trade secret protection is not at the core of a dispute, parties 
may need to protect their trade secrets from disclosure in discovery or from 
disclosure by courts committed to providing open and public access.  To 
this end, TRADE SECRET LITIGATION AND PROTECTION IN 
CALIFORNIA includes chapters addressing the trade secret privilege and 
the First Amendment right of access to court records.  The discussion of the 
trade secret privilege (Chapter 20) provides background and strategies for 
asserting the privilege and for protecting trade secrets even when disclosure 
is mandated by a court.  The First Amendment chapter (Chapter 21), 
however, is largely theoretical providing little more than the justification for 
why our courts are open without providing the practitioner with useful 
strategies for actually achieving secrecy in an open environment.  
 
From the preface, it appears that TRADE SECRET LITIGATION AND 
PROTECTION IN CALIFORNIA was finished for print in April 2009.  
This means that, although the book is only a year old, it is already not as up-
to-date as it could be.  And, unfortunately, there does not appear to be any 
plan to supplement or update the book regularly.  Thus, the user of this 
book will need to be sure to undertake a careful review of the legal issues to 
ensure that the law is current.   
 
Further, although California’s trade secret law is based on the Uniform 
Trade Secret Act, the authors and editors have chosen not to include 
discussions of issues decided under UTSA in other jurisdictions that may be 
persuasive to a California court.  Of course, in the interest of brevity, this 
shortcoming is easily forgiven (especially in a book that is already over 600 
pages).  Nonetheless, it would seem that much of the book’s repetition 
could be eliminated in favor of more thorough discussions of hot legal 
issues – even where there is no direct California law on point.  These 
shortcomings, however, are relatively minor and, in the end, TRADE 
SECRET LITIGATION AND PROTECTION IN CALIFORNIA succeeds 
in providing both an invaluable overview of trade secret law in California as 
well as a resource that even experienced practitioners can turn to for 
guidance.  
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In common parlance, the term "ethics" is most often associated with that 
branch of philosophy which seeks to address questions about morality; 
concepts such as good and evil, right and wrong, justice, and virtue.  There 
is currently much debate over the morality of certain types of patents, 
particularly patents relating to genes and embryonic stem cells, as reflected 
in a number of recent books and articles on the subject, as well as attempts 
to strike down patents perceived by some to be immoral, both in the U.S. 
and abroad.  But in the context of legal practice, the word is more often 
used to describe the rules of professional responsibility that govern the 
conduct of attorneys and other professionals, the violation of which can lead 
to severe and costly consequences for practitioners and their clients, and it 
is in this sense that PATENT ETHICS: PROSECUTION uses the term. 
 
The book provides practical advice for patent practitioners to assist them in 
navigating the challenging professional responsibility environment in which 
they operate. This is not a philosophical inquiry; the focus is on managing 
risk and avoiding malpractice liability, and there is little if any discussion of 
truly moral considerations.  That said, PATENT ETHICS does an excellent 
job of identifying the many potential “ethical” pitfalls confronting these 
practitioners, in a manner that is comprehensive, up-to-date and practical, 
filling an important niche that to my knowledge is not addressed in any 
other book.  It also provides practical advice on best practices, along with 
exemplary language for use in written communications with clients and 
potential clients, and should be a welcome addition to the bookshelf of 
many patent prosecutors. 
 
The book is co-authored by David Hricik, a law professor with substantial 
practice experience, and Mercedes Meyer, an attorney whose practice 
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focuses on patent prosecution in the area of biopharmaceuticals.  As 
correctly noted by Stanford's Professor Mark Lemley on the book's back 
cover, "David Hricik is the nation's leading expert on patent ethics".  He has 
written extensively on professional responsibility in patent practice, both 
prosecution and litigation related, and this book is in large part the product 
of a consolidation and updating of his previous publications in this area. 
 
According to the authors, and I do not doubt that this is true, malpractice 
claims based on the alleged violation of the standards of professional 
responsibility or other errors in patent prosecution have increased 
dramatically in recent years, both in number and the severity of the 
consequences (p.2), making the book particularly timely.  The book reports 
that firms practicing patent law have recently displaced securities law firms 
for the unenviable distinction of the highest cost for malpractice insurance 
(p.2). Law firms and practitioners are not the only ones at risk; ethical 
missteps by practitioners, inventors, and other individuals involved in patent 
prosecution can result in a finding of inequitable conduct, potentially 
rendering a valuable patent unenforceable.  The stakes are high, and the 
book's succinct, thorough and up-to-date treatment of the subject provides 
much-needed guidance for practitioners seeking to minimize and manage 
the risk. 
 
The authors begin by explaining the scope of authority granted to patent 
practitioners registered to practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO), and perhaps more importantly, the limits on that authority, 
which if exceeded can constitute the unauthorized practice of law, an ethical 
violation.  One aspect of patent prosecution that distinguishes it from other 
legal practices is the ability of non-lawyer patent agents to perform many of 
the legal tasks performed by patent attorneys.  However, as non-attorneys, 
patent agents only have authority to represent applicants before the PTO "in 
the preparation and prosecution of patent applications,” and thus assisting 
clients in related matters such as opinion work, licensing, or contracts can 
easily lead to the unauthorized practice of law by the patent agent.  In 2008, 
the PTO issued formal guidance delineating a more narrowly circumscribed 
range of permissible prosecution-related activities for patent agents than 
many had previously assumed.  The book summarizes the guidance, and 
discusses the important implications for patent agents and attorneys who 
work with patent agents.   
 
In Chapter 3 the book identifies and summarizes the various state, federal, 
and model codes of professional conduct that can apply to patent 
practitioners.  In some cases, there can be a conflict between the ethical 
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obligations dictated by state law and the PTO Code of Professional 
Conduct, potentially rendering it difficult if not impossible for a practitioner 
to satisfy both.  Resolution of the conflict could depend on whether the PTO 
Code preempts state law, but unfortunately it is currently unclear whether 
courts will apply preemption in this context.  The authors make a strong 
case for preemption, but conclude with the sound practical advice that a 
practitioner should seriously consider following the more stringent of the 
potentially applicable standards to avoid becoming the test case to address 
the issue (p.19). 
 
The book also addresses problems a practitioner might encounter relating to 
client identity.  For example, an inventor might assume that the practitioner 
is her lawyer, when in fact it is the inventor’s employer, or perhaps another 
third party who has retained the practitioner, that is actually the client to 
whom the practitioner’s allegiance must lie.  The authors provide practical 
advice for clarifying the relationship between inventor and practitioner early 
on to minimize misunderstanding and a potential lawsuit (p.37).   
 
Some of the thorniest issues facing patent prosecutors arise as a 
consequence of potential conflicts between duties owed to the client and to 
the PTO.  For example, the PTO Code of Professional Conduct imposes a 
duty of candor on patent practitioners, which can conflict with the duties of 
loyalty and confidentiality set forth in the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and state 
disciplinary rules.  Resolution of the conflict might vary from state to state, 
and could depend on whether the state standards of responsibility are 
preempted by the federal PTO code, and as pointed out in the book there 
currently is no clear answer.  In fact, in some situations it might be 
impossible for a practitioner to maintain compliance with all of the rules.  
The authors effectively explain the nature of the conflict and provide advice 
to help practitioners deal with the situation should it arise or, better yet, 
avoid getting into the situation altogether. 
 
When a patent is litigated, it has become common for the alleged infringer 
to accuse the patent owner of inequitable conduct in order to render the 
patent unenforceable.  These claims are most often rooted in allegations of 
prosecution misconduct by the applicant and/or practitioner, such as a 
failure to comply with the duty of candor.  If inequitable conduct is shown, 
the consequences can be severe, not only for the patent owner, but also for 
the practitioner who might become the subject of a malpractice lawsuit or 
professional sanctions.  It is thus appropriate that a large part of the book is 
devoted to the duty of candor and inequitable conduct, running through 
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many of the various prosecution scenarios that have led to allegations of 
inequitable conduct, and providing guidance to practitioners for minimizing 
the risk. 
 
The primary message I took away from reading the book is that patent 
prosecution is a professional responsibility minefield, and there are 
practices that raise the risk of stumbling upon a mine, but there are also 
practical strategies for minimizing the risk.  For example, representing 
multiple clients attempting to patent inventions relating to similar subject 
matter can leverage the technical expertise of a practitioner or law firm, but 
also increases the potential for conflicts.  Movement of attorneys from one 
firm to another, particularly when partners bring a large number of cases 
and clients to the new firm, likewise increases the potential for conflicts.  A 
firm or attorney that chooses to both litigate and prosecute patents takes on 
additional risk, particularly in cases where the same firm that prosecuted a 
patent attempts to represent the client in an infringement litigation involving 
the same patent.  The authors do a good job of explaining the risks, and 
providing recommendations of best practices for ameliorating risk. 
 
Another point brought out by the book is that in many cases it would be 
impractical or cost prohibitive for a firm to adopt practices that would 
wholly eliminate the risk of creating an inadvertent conflict.  The authors 
recognize the practical limitations on real-world legal practice, and identify 
the current prevalent practice by law firms (p.157), which is often less than 
optimal for avoiding conflict but which is all that is possible without 
becoming so costly that it would be too expensive for clients. 
 
Although in my view the primary audience for this book will be 
practitioners, it will also be of interest to academics and judges seeking a 
concise treatise on the topic.  The authors not only provide practical advice 
for dealing with the law as it currently stands, but also point out problems 
and policy concerns with the current state of the law, as well as some 
practical solutions.  For example, some recent inequitable conduct decisions 
seem to adopt an overly expansive view of the duty to disclose, which not 
only overburdens the patent examiner but also increases costs for the clients 
(p.158).  It also creates a Catch-22 for the patent applicant, who might one 
day be charged with disclosing too many references and thereby burying the 
key references. The book implies that judges on the Federal Circuit could 
do a better job of deciding inequitable conduct cases in a manner that 
creates the proper incentives for candid disclosure without unnecessarily 
imposing vague and onerous disclosure requirements on patent practitioners 
and their clients (pp.152-54). 
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Although overall the book will serve as a valuable resource for patent 
prosecutors, some sections provided little substantive value and struck me 
as unnecessary filler.  For example, in Chapter 7 the authors explore the 
ethical duty of competency in the context of patent prosecution by 
addressing various substantive aspects of patent law and practice.  Some of 
the observations in this chapter struck me as painfully obvious.  For 
example, the authors state that "[a]lthough electrical engineers and 
mechanical engineers can frequently prosecute patents in each other's area, 
many biotechnology practitioners would not feel comfortable prosecuting 
applications directed to semiconductors or software" (p.77).  Belaboring the 
point, they observe that "a mechanical engineer or electrical engineer might 
be no more competent in discerning the best ways to claim a stem cell and 
obviate the existing part, than a practitioner with a doctoral or masters 
degree in molecular biology necessarily would be in working on subject 
matter relating to microchip design or laser design” (p.79).  The audience 
for this book is sophisticated enough not to need this sort of mundane 
advice. 
 
The substantive aspects of patent law and patent prosecution extend well 
beyond the scope of a book such as this, which is focused on professional 
responsibility, and I think much of Chapter 7 could have been omitted.  In 
some cases, the authors provide very specific advice on claim drafting, for 
example, where they assert that "stem cells today are better claimed in a 
product-by-process claim, as the full understanding of the subject matter 
defies ready description as a product" (p.78).  But only a small fraction of 
readers will be drafting claims to stem cells, and those that are presumably 
have thought through the various alternate ways for claiming them, so why 
include this in the book?  At the other extreme, the book provides cursory 
treatment to patent doctrines such as the definiteness and best mode 
requirements, which I also suspect most readers would find unhelpful. This 
book will be primarily of interest to patent practitioners, who are well aware 
of the basic doctrines of patentability, and for those who don't there are 
already fine treatises on patent law which provide extensive coverage of 
these topics. 
 
Another section of the book I found to be unnecessary filler is Appendix 3, 
which provides a 26-page list of final decisions by the PTO Office of 
Enrollment and Discipline (OED).  Anyone interested in looking at these 
decisions can access them online. The authors provide brief parentheticals 
characterizing the decision, e.g., "practitioner was excluded on consent from 
practice before the USPTO," or "practitioner was suspended for an 
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indeterminate period from practice before the USPTO,” but without further 
analysis I don't see that the list provides any substantive value to readers. 
 
While in my view some of the book's content could have been omitted, its 
inclusion is consistent with the authors’ clear intent to provide a thorough, 
comprehensive, and up-to-date treatise on this important and timely topic.  
Overall, I see the book as a valuable contribution to the literature, filling an 
important need.  In the future, when I have any question involving patent 
prosecution and professional ethics, I am sure that PATENT ETHICS will 
be the first place I turn. 
 
© 2010 Christopher M. Holman 
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Human rights and patent rights have become increasingly intertwined in 
discussions surrounding access to pharmaceutical drugs by citizens of 
developing countries.  This discussion is a particularly contentious one for 
reasons of socioeconomics and geography.  Drug companies in more 
developed countries (“MDCs”) tend to own the patent rights covering 
newer medicines, and justify the monopoly prices they charge as a 
necessary return on investment for inventing new drugs.  Less developed 
countries (“LDCs”), lacking the purchasing power to pay monopoly prices 
for patented drugs, tend to argue that monopoly prices for drugs violate 
human rights of access to medicines.  The result is an often shrill debate 
over the primacy of patent rights or human rights.  In his excellent book, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES, Holger Hestermeyer has tackled this complex 
and contentious conflict, disentangled it into its essential constituent parts, 
including patent law, human rights, and international trade under the World 
Trade Organisation (“WTO”) regime and its side-agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”), and then artfully 
reconstructed a clear, cogent, and hopeful model of how to approach a 
resolution.  His research is meticulous, his prose spare yet fluent, and his 
arguments persuasive and well-supported. 
 
One of the signal strengths of the book is its masterful illustration of how 
interconnected seemingly disparate areas of legal doctrine can be.  The book 
neatly clarifies and contextualizes the clash between patent rights and 
human rights over access to drugs in LDCs, and then illuminates the most 
significant issues underlying this clash to make them both accessible and 
fascinating to the reader.  This is more difficult than it might appear to be.  
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Human rights law is usually associated with passionate advocates and moral 
arguments.  It inspires strong opinions among both supporters and 
opponents of particular initiatives, and excites broad interest.  By contrast, 
patent law and international trade law are burdened by esoteric doctrines, 
impenetrable nomenclatures, and highly technical subject matters.  Much 
more limited audiences are attracted to discussions of most-favored nation 
status, nonobviousness, non-tariff barriers, and swearing behind prior art.  
However, by demonstrating the vital implications that human rights law, 
patent law, and international trade law have for each other, the book makes 
all three fields more interesting.  Furthermore, by demonstrating that the 
apparent independence of human rights law, patent law, and international 
trade law is illusory, at least in the case of access to medicines in LDCs, the 
book illustrates the need for legal scholars focused on any one specialty to 
expand their understanding of other specialties, if only to understand their 
own specialty more completely. 
 
The book takes a systematic approach to the issue of human rights, patent 
rights, international trade, and access to patented drugs in LDCs.  After a 
brief précis of the main argument, Chapters 2 and 3 provide backgrounds to 
patent law and access to medicine as a human right, respectively.  These 
two chapters provide a reader inexpert in either of these two areas of law 
with detailed, yet manageable, tours through their histories, rationales, and 
current legal doctrines.  Particular strengths of Chapter 2 include the context 
it provides for current national and international patent regimes.  It 
accomplishes this through a detailed consideration of the historical origins 
and diversity of philosophical justifications underlying patents and an 
effective overview of the rights conferred by the patent grant.  Chapter 4 
sets up the central argument of the book: that TRIPS-imposed patent 
regimes in both MDCs and LDCs block access to patented drugs in LDCs 
by imposing unaffordably high prices.  Chapter 5 then suggests that this 
problem of access may be ameliorated, though not entirely solved, by a 
“human rights-based interpretation” of TRIPS-imposed patent obligations 
that privileges rights of access to medicine over strong enforcement of 
patent rights. 
 
Hestermeyer does not hide that fact that his sympathies lie with greater 
access to patented drugs in LDCs.  Yet, he resists the temptation to call for 
radical legal change.  It is a testament to the balanced and scholarly 
approach he takes in his book that the solution he advocates relies on 
countries’ fulfillment of their existing human rights obligations rather than 
the imposition of new legal obligations concerning patents, international 
trade, and human rights.  The book concludes cautiously, suggesting that 
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the conflict between patent rights and human rights is permanent, and will 
require constant rebalancing (p.292). 
 
The weaknesses of the book are rather insubstantial in comparison to its 
considerable strengths.  Only a few bear mention.  In general, the citations 
are excellent.  In fact, the wealth of research found in the footnotes alone 
makes this book a valuable resource for scholars.  Occasionally, however, a 
substantial factual assertion goes unsupported or the support cited is weak 
or mistaken.  For example, early in the book Hestermeyer makes the 
assertion that there exists a “common claim that inventors traditionally (and 
everywhere) have a right to a patent” (p.21).  No citation is provided to 
support this bold statement, and little support can be found elsewhere in the 
book.  Later, philosopher John Locke is described as “rooting patent 
protection in natural law” (p.25), though Locke himself fails even to 
mention patents in the cited reference.  Another weakness involves the 
strong assertion that patents lead to higher prices for medicinal drugs (e.g., 
pp.135-166).  “Higher” implies a comparison to something else, as 
Hestermeyer himself acknowledges (p.144).  But, for a drug to receive 
patent protection in a properly functioning patent system, that drug must 
have been new and nonobvious compared to the prior art.  What can the 
price of a previously unknown drug, adjudicated by a scientifically-skilled 
patent examiner to be significantly different than existing drugs, be 
meaningfully higher than?  While it is true that competition in the absence 
of patent protection could lower prices by preventing the patent owner from 
successfully charging monopoly prices, the book appears neither to 
advocate the abolition of patents in all countries nor to offer persuasive 
evidence that, absent the incentive of patent protection, a sufficient supply 
of new and useful drugs would be invented and developed prospectively.  
This claim of “higher” prices, so important to the overall thesis of the book, 
requires either better justification or better explanation of the justification 
provided.  Finally, Hestermeyer focuses his discussions of drugs almost 
entirely on small-molecule drugs, certainly a traditional mainstay of 
pharmaceutical medicine, but a category of drugs whose relative importance 
is rapidly declining in the face of newer “biologics” developed by 
biotechnology.  In fact, the word “biotechnology” does not even appear in 
the subject index (p.361).  Nevertheless, these few quibbles are greatly 
outweighed by the many and manifest strengths of the book. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO is a necessary resource for any scholar 
interested in the legal nexus of human rights, patents, and international 
trade.  It provides a superb model of how to integrate multiple, disparate 
bodies of law into a cogent and synthetic account.  This book provides a 
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well-researched, well-written, and persuasive account of, and approach to, a 
modern medical tragedy the resolution of which has proved complicated, 
unpredictable, and elusive.  Through a combination of meticulous research, 
an obvious interest in ensuring that medicines reach the patients who need 
them in LDCs, and a fluent ability to weave together three complex and 
largely disparate bodies of law, Holger Hestermeyer has produced a 
masterful synthesis of law, policy, and measured advocacy. 
 
© 2010 Andrew W. Torrance 
 
 
